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LENDING MONEY 
"Neither a lender nor a borrower be" _ , Poiomus 
In this paper, I have put clown some very 
tentative thoughts on loans, firstly as they 
are used in financing small-scale African 
enterprises, and secondly as a service 
African businessmen give to their customers. 
These remarks arise out of research in 
progress, and may well need to be revised 
when the findings are more complete, and 
have been analysed., Meanwhile, I hope what 
follows will suggest a few ideas for 
discussion, in a field of development where 
there are many problems, little previous 
experience and knowledge to go by, but 
already hopeful progress. 
The development of Kenya depends much on 
lending money - by foreign governments to the Kenya 
Government; by the Kenya Government to farmers, 
co-operatives, settlers, businesses; and by these in 
turn, sometimes, to their customers. Few of these loans 
are strictly commercial, in the sense that the lender is 
looking for the most profitable return on his investment. 
They are part of a development strategy, where the 
lender's aim is to promote economic growth as efficiently 
as he can, rather than to make the safest or largest 
profit. 
The need for these loans usually arises 
because the investment is too uncertain, or the profit 
too small, to attract commercial capital. The borrower 
may have little or no security to offer, his credit-
worthiness may be impossible to assess, the viability of 
his enterprise may be speculative. The purpose of the 
loan is, therefore, to supply a need for capital where 
commercial safeguards against bad risks, and sanctions 
against default cannot easily be applied. And the 
lender is looking for a different kind of returns even 
if he loses money, he has achieved his essential aim if 
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he has promoted a significant growth in the economy. 
Such development loans cannot, then, be 
treated as if they were straightforward commercial loans. 
They involve a different kind of relationship between 
lender and borrower, where mutual trust and understanding 
are much more important„ The lender cannot simply 
calculate the rate of profit that would justify the risk, 
and secure himself by legal contract against too severe 
a loss. He has to explain the kind of development he 
hopes to achieve, and find borrowers who want to achieve 
it, trusting very largely in the sincerity of their 
intentions. 
His first problem, of course, is that his 
confidence may be abused. The borrower may not use the 
money for the purpose intended - a government builds a 
palace instead of irrigation works, a farmer gets a new 
wife instead of fertilizers and ploughs. But apart from 
such bad faith - as the lender sees it - there are, I 
think, great difficulties in working out the expectations 
and obligations of such a relationship between lender 
and borrower, even where the intentions of both are 
sincere. 
Here I want to discuss a particular strategy 
of lending, which can be illustrated, for instance, by 
the Industrial and Commercial Development Corporation's 
small industries loan scheme. A limited amount of money 
is provided for a revolving fund, which is lent at a 
rate of interest high enough to cover the cost of 
administering the fund, and to service the debt which the 
government itself may have incurred in setting it up. 
The loans are to be repaid by instalment over about 
seven years, so that the fund can, in fact, revolve. 
Since the purpose of the scheme is to promote African 
enterprises in a field where as yet few are established, 
it has little experience to guide it in assessing the 
viability of projects put to it, or the competence of the 
applicants. Nor can it insist too much on adequate 
security, so long as the scheme hopes to encourage 
talent held back for lack of access to capital - since 
some of these talented people will have little by way of 
security to offer. At the outset, promising projects 
are examined, and the hopeful ones financed, without 
strict regard for guarantees. 
Inevitably, there are disappointments. 
Ventures fail through mismanagement, technical difficulties, 
Peter Harris 
3 
lack of a market. A new bakery attracts more determined 
competition from those already established, and cannot 
sustain a price-cutting war. A sawmill fails to obtain 
an allocation of forest timber. Machines do not turn 
out a satisfactory product. A partnership breaks up in 
recriminati on, and when the books are gone through, a 
great deal of money has disappeared. Some of these 
misfortunes are bad luck, and could not have been 
foreseen, but meanwhile the revolving fund is being-
drained, and the whole operation endangered. The scheme 
has, then, to become tougher in self-protection. It 
begins to insist more strictly on security, and to 
control more closely the way the money is spent. So, 
for instance, the I.C.D.C. generally prefers to give 
loans for machinery, workshops, and other recoverable 
assets, rather than for working capital. And it pays 
for these itself, once the borrower has placed his 
orders, so that it can be sure that the loan is spent 
exactly as agreed. If the instalments are not repaid, 
it can then insist that the assets are sold up, and at 
least recover some of its money. It must, of course, be 
prepared for this, and has a responsibility to protect 
its resources. But the safeguards can have awkward 
consequences. 
If an enterprise is chiefly dependent on 
government loans, then it needs government help as much, 
or more, for working capital as for machinery; otherwise 
there will not be enough money to keep the machines 
working. Once a business runs into difficulties, they 
quickly become cumulative. A machine breaks down; by 
the time it is repaired, the business has run out of 
money to fuel it or feed it supplies, so the business 
shuts down again. By then it is losing its customers, 
the I.C.D.C. is beginning to press for its instalments 
on the loan, and within a few months of starting, 
collapse may already be near. At the same time, since 
loan repayments begin usually six months after the 
granting of the loan - when the machinery bought with it 
may scarcely be installed and fully working - there is 
almost no margin to allow for unforeseen difficulties. 
I do not mean to suggest that this is what 
happens to most of the enterprises supported by the 
I.C.D.C., or that the I.C.D.C. is wrong to guard its 
fund carefully. But there are some, I think, whose 
chances of success would be greater but for the conditions 
under which the loan is granted. That is, the regulations 
needed to protect the loan fund from depletion tend to 
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inhibit the flexibility needed, to give every enterprise 
supported the best chance. A lending institution like 
the I.C.L.C. has therefore to make an uncomfortable 
choice. If it insists on its regulations, it may have 
to wind up enterprises which with more time, more advice, 
and perhaps more money could succeed; and it will still 
lose a part of its investment. If it relaxes its 
regulations, then it is likely to lose even more. The 
choice depends in part on what it takes as its criterion 
of success. If, fundamentally, the purpose is to 
promote viable new enterprises, then so long as this 
happens, it is less important that the loan fund may 
become exhausted in time through default. But, naturally 
enough, a public institution accountable for its 
management tends to become preoccupied with the 
protection of the fund. 
It can happen, for instance, that an 
enterprise which could afford to repay its loan 
instalments instead uses the money for further develop-
ment - hiring overseas a dvice, installing electricity, 
replacing unsatisfactory machines with more efficient 
ones. The managers of the business may well be right 
that the investment is crucial to their progress, and 
the returns will justify it. But the lending institution 
cannot look at it this way. The fund depends on regular 
repayment of a fixed sum on a fixed day. It does not 
stand to gain anything by deferring payment, though the 
business itself may become much more profitable. A loan 
scheme cannot compensate for its support of businesses 
which fail by a higher return from those which succeed. 
Considered simply as a financing organization, the 
scheme is not concerned with the development it has 
promoted, but only with getting its money back. 
In general terms, this is the paradox. The 
government wants to promote economic enterprise, and 
enable people with talent and initiative to exploit it. 
Government only needs to provide capital itself, where 
commercial capital is not willing to invest - that is, 
where the risks are high. So, to fulfill their purpose, 
the loans must go where little security can be offered, 
where there is little previous experience, and a great 
many unknowns. Inevitably, there are losses, and in 
reaction, government is likely to take one of two 
courses. It may restrict its loans to those who have 
experience and adequate security, or impose tight 
regulations. If it does the first, it may become 
redundant, lending where private capital would be equally 
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willing to invest. And if it does the second, it may 
create conditions which many potentially viable 
enterprises cannot meet. It may also go so far in 
control that the borrower feels he has lost the 
initiative, and leaves the lending organization to run 
his affairs. When things go wrong, he looks to the 
lending body to tell him what to do next, while they 
expect him to assume the responsibility. Between the 
two, the situation may deteriorate irrevocably - the 
lender threatening to sue for his money, while the 
borrower is still petitioning for help and further 
funds. There is sometimes genuine confusion over the 
legal responsibilities the borrower has entailed. He 
tends to see the loan as part of a mutual co-operation 
in development - as indeed it is. But the lending 
institution tends to repudiate any responsibility for 
success or failure, insisting on the contractual 
commitment to repay, regardless of circumstances. 
The relationship is, therefore, very difficult 
to establish on a basis of mutual understanding. Both 
lender and borrower share the belief that men with the 
initiative to start new enterprises deserve to be 
encouraged, and that this will create employment and a 
larger African share in the money economy. It is 
probably the African businessmen and progressive 
farmers who are doing most to pioneer the social changes 
in values and working habits on which development 
depends. But, though they share the same aims, the 
interests of lender and borrower tend to diverge as soon 
as problems arise. The first becomes preoccupied with 
saving his capital, the second with saving his 
enterprise. So, for instance, while the I.C.D.C. may be 
pressing for the repayment of its loan, the business is 
still talking of further loans, replacing obsolete 
machinery with more modern, diversifying its activities, 
or opening new branches to increase its market. And it 
seems that sometimes, to limit its risks, the I.C.D.C. 
may have been reluctant to grant enough for efficient 
machinery, and especially for working capital, to ensure 
the most promising start. And being short staffed, it 
cannot give much time to supervision and advice. By the 
time a business is in serious difficulties, it may be 
reluctant to approach the I.C.D.C. frankly, fearing that 
if it reveals the extent of its problems, it will only 
remind the I.C.D.C. of its indebtedness. 
Given these difficulties, I wonder whether a 
loan represents most appropriately the kind of 
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relationship the I.C.D.C. is trying to establish with 
the small industries it supports- Prom its own point 
of view, loans have the disadvantage that the return is 
the same, irrespective of the success of the enterprise. 
It loses on failures which cannot repay, but cannot 
balance the loss by sharing in the profits of its 
successes. Having no part in the management, it cannot 
easily influence the operation of the business, once it 
has agreed the iot:n. Prom tne point of view of the 
business, the conditions under which the loan is granted 
leave very little margin for unforeseen difficulties, 
and may even inhibit the proper use of the new assets 
for lack of uncommitted resources, while the obligation 
of the loan instalments easily makes the I.C.li.C. seem -
through no fault of its own - less a partner in 
development than an intimidating creditor. 
Would it make more sense to replace loans by 
the investment of equity capital in these businesses? 
This represents more nearly, I think, the kind of co-
operation which government is trying to establish, and 
meets most of the problems discussed above. When an 
enterprise is well-established, government should be able 
to recover its investment at a profit; it has a right to 
be represented in the management; the capital it has 
invested does not have to be repaid on pre-determined 
dates, irrespective of the needs of the business; it 
could be less specific about the particular use of its 
contribution; and it would be much more continuously 
in touch with the progress of the enterprise. There 
should probably be, also, a central auditing service to 
supervise the book-keeping. No doubt there are 
disadvantages to such a scheme, too. There would no 
longer, for instance, be a strictly revolving fund -
though I doubt whether it is very realistic to suppose 
that any such fund can be self-s ms *t ining for long, 
given tne high risks of promoting small businesses in 
new fields. So the alternative of investment seems at 
least worth considering. 
If it is not practicable, then I wonder 
whether there might be more emphasis on advice and 
training, rather than loans alone. Fewer or smaller-
loans, backed by an advisory service, would, I think, in 
the long run contribute more to development. Advisory 
services are expensive - especially as tiiey can be worse 
than useless, unless the advice is really competent and 
imaginative, and so need well-qualified personnel. But 
part of the cost might be saved by inviting businessmen 
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already established to volunteer their services as 
occasional consultants in their field, organized through 
the advisory service. Already some of the businesses 
get very useful advice in this way, learning from each 
other's experience. And I have never heard of anyone 
refusing advice, for fear of giving a competitor an 
advantage: African businessmen seem very ready to help 
each other in this way, with little sense of rivalry. 
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I turn now to another kind of lender-borrower 
relationship. 
The granting of credit to customers is one of 
the most widely acknowledged reasons for the failure of 
African businesses. African shopkeepers themselves 
list credit amongst their outstanding difficulties, and 
they woulci. advise a newcomer to business to give little 
or no credit at the outset. Yet it seems that nearly 
all of them do give credit, and often lose money by it. 
In one market centre near Nairobi, for instance, about 
90% of the businesses give substantial credit, and more 
than four fifths of these have incurred bad debts. The 
amounts are not large - from less than a hundred 
shillings to five thousand, with about half of the 
businesses owed more than four hundred shillings which 
they are unlikely to recover. But since many of these 
businesses probably do n 0 "t F 6 ct lize more than two hundred 
shillings profit in a month, the loss is serious. 
These businesses do not give credit 
indiscriminately to all their customers, except for a 
very few. They give to regular and reliable customers, 
as they say, people they know, those with regular 
salaries, teachers and government employees, friends or 
prosperous farmers. But their judgement of who can be 
trusted is evidently not very sure, since they lose 
money just the same. And it is not always easy to take 
effective action against those who do not pay. Although 
most say they are prepared to take defaulters to court, 
only a minority have ever done so, and the outcome some-
times hardly justifies it. Each individual debt may be 
too small to justify the expense, especially as the debt 
may still not be paid, inspite of the court order. And 
many of the businessmen fear to make themselves unpopular 
by initiating prosecutions, when it comes to the point. 
At the same time, only half the businessmen 
Peter Harris 
8 
in this market believed, that they needed to give credit 
to retain customers. About two fifths give credit, lose 
money by it, and yet maintain that they need not do so 
to run a successful business. It is hard to say 
exactly whys they are influenced, I think, by prevailing 
custom, and by a sense of obligation to help people who 
could not otherwise afford to buy. But it seems clear 
that credit is not generally given simply to secure a 
commercial advantage. Most businessmen, if they set 
the loss of customers through refusing credit against 
the loss through bad debts of giving it, would almost 
certainly decide against credit. This is the advice 
they give, but do not follow. Credit seems at least in 
part a response to expectations in the community which 
they do not like to repudiate. 
The relationship between a shopkeeper and his 
credit customers has, then, this in common with the 
relationship between government and the enterprises it 
lends to; in neither case is the money lent primarily 
for commercial reasons, but rather because the lender 
sympathizes with the borrower's needs, and believes that 
by helping him, he will be helping the progress of the 
community. And in both cases, it is hard to pursue 
defaulters ruthlessly without contradicting these 
altruistic aims. At the same time, the lender is open 
to exploitation, because he has few sanctions he can 
apply, is reluctant to make himself unpopular or cause 
hardship by applying them, and cannot easily judge who 
will prove trustworthy. With the shopkeepers as with 
government loans, part of the trouble lies in the 
different circumstances of lender and borrower, which 
make their interests hard to adjust. 
The shopkeeper is buying his stock, usually 
for cash, and if he can get credit at all from his 
suppliers, it seldom runs for more than a month. So he 
works to a monthly cycle, while his customers are 
chiefly farmers, whose economic cycle is seasonal. It 
seems, once you think of it, odd tiiat credit in an 
agricultural country should be tied to the monthly wage 
packet, when most people are not wage earners at all, 
but must wait for the harvest. But there is nothing 
the African shopkeeper can do about this, since his own 
access to credit is very restricted, if he has any at 
all - far more restricted than for the Indian shopkeeper 
with whom he competes, or the Indian wholesaler from 
whom he typically gets his stock, but who seldom trusts 
him with an advance. 
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At the same time, the farmer's attitude to 
credit may be influenced by a tradition of mutual help 
which is not governed by a strict timetable, especially 
where farming has not yet been greatly influenced by 
cash crops and government loans. A plough contractor 
in the coastal region, for instance, failed because his 
customers treated the service as they were used to 
treat help from a member of their community - as an 
obligation to be repaid as and when they could. But 
meanwhile, fuel had to be bought for the tractors, 
repairs paid for, loan instalments repaid. He was 
reluctant to take anyone to court, because he was 
genuinely concerned to promote the agricultural progress 
of his district, and did not want to discourage people 
from adopting modern techniques by associating them with 
legal prosecutions. The business failed, but he did 
succeed in demonstrating the value of using tractor 
driven ploughs, and he believes that if such a business 
were started again, people would now be more willing to 
pay promptly. Someone else will probably gain the 
advantage of his pioneering. 
His experience can be compared with another 
plough contractor on a settlement scheme on the coast, 
who did very well, and new has several lorries and 
tractors bought with his own money, besides the equipment 
acquired through a government loan. Both men, as it 
happens, gained new ideas partly from their army 
experience, and while the one who failed had a few years 
primary educa tion, the successful had no formal education 
at all. The different fate of their enterprises was not, 
I think, determined by differences in their competence 
or purposefulness, but rather by the difference between 
the communities in which they were living. The farmers 
on the settlement scheme were more familiar with the 
demands of a money economy, and they formed a more 
impersonal community from different regions, recently 
promoted by government action. So they were already 
conditioned to understand the need for prompt payment 
of the tractor's hire, and for sanctions against default. 
As the country makes progress, I think 
successful businesses will give less and less credit, 
and more selectively. The businesses supported by the 
I.C.D.C. which I have met, who represent the more 
ambitious enterprises growing out of communities and 
market centres, are much less ready to give credit; 
about a third none at all, and the rest only cautiously. 
They have learned by experience. About a third have 
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accumulated bad debts in the past, sometimes running 
into thousands of shillings. A few have begun to use 
hire purchase agreements, or ask for security. So it 
seems that as businesses grow more sophisticated, and 
larger in scale, the prevailing practice of credit 
begins to disappear. There is a popular picture, which 
you may find in shops up and down the country - printed 
I think in America early in this century. On the left, 
a harassed man, head in hand, sits despairingly amongst 
a pile of papers. On the right, a prosperous looking 
gentleman with a comfortably round waist stands in 
front of his safe, smiling complacently. The caption 
on the left reads ®I have given credit® and on the 
right 'for credit come tomorrow'. (And when tomorrow 
comes, of course, the customer will get the same answer). 
The future seems to lie with a philosophy of strictly 
cash transactions. 
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Both these examples of a relationship between 
lender and borrower show how difficult it is to establish 
a pattern of obligation which is workable from both 
points of view, when the concern is not merely with a 
mutual calculation of financial advantage. The lender's 
desire to promote the well-being of the community makes 
strictly commercial terms inapplicable, but no other 
really satisfactory control takes its place. The 
outcome tends to be an uneasy hesitation between legal 
enforcement and a desire to maintain goodwill and co-
operation for the future. In the end, businessmen are 
seeking to extricate themselves from a kind of relation-
ship which causes more trouble than it is worth, while 
government may be wise to do the same, and look for other 
terms on which to co-operate in the development of private 
enterprise. (And it may be that the same is true of 
international loans to developing countries; the 
relationship is certainly uneasy, and fraught with a good 
deal of mutual disappointment). We need, I think, to 
search more imaginatively for ways of distributing-
capital for development, which can embody more effectively 
the mutual purpose, and establish a pattern of expectation 
which both parties can meet. In the promotion of enter-
prises, the solution may lie in a scheme of government 
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participation through, equity capital; for retail 
businesses, in offering, perhaps, discounts to customers 
who deposit money in advance. But whatever the solution, 
it will have to be worked out in terms of social 
controls which people can abide by, and represent values 
and interests which they share. 
The notion of 'security® sums up the whole 
problem. For security in the sense of attachable assets 
is only a means of achieving security in the wider-
sense of protection against risk. But in the circumstances 
of a developing country, like Kenya, ambitious to for 
rapid progress and new forms of economic activity, the 
risks are bound to be high. The question is not, I think, 
how to avoid risk, but how the risk can be most fairly 
distributed. The security which most people can offer is 
their land. But given the deep attachment to land, and 
the ultimate dependence on it for livelihood and protection 
against hardship, how many people can really afford to 
hazard their land for business ventures? When it comes to 
the point, will government be ruthless enough to demand 
this sacrifice as the price of failure? Is it after all 
fair that those who pioneer new enterprises should take 
so great a risk? I would guess that most businessmen, 
when they give their land as security, do not seriously 
consider the possibility that they will lose it. Nor, 
so far as I know, has anyone yet been forced to sell his 
farm through his business failure. The common practice 
of securing loans against land may well not be an 
equitable way of sharing risk, and recognising this, it 
may not be enforced. 
In practice, the government is generally seen 
as the carrier of risk - not only by those who seek loans, 
but by banks which, it seems, seldom accept any 
responsibility to venture their capital in the promotion 
of the African economy. The government can take it all. 
But, of course, if the government did, indeed, shoulder-
all the risks, there would be little incentive to those 
y/ho receive loans to make every effort to justify the 
privilege of a share in scarce development capital. So, 
on tne one hand, the insistence on security from the 
borrower tends to force him, in principle, to risk his 
whole livelihood; while reliance on the government's 
ability to spread its risks, leaves the borrower too little 
committed. What is needed, I think, is a system which 
ensures that both government and businessmen, or business-
man and customer, distribute the risks equitably, in terms 
of their own resources. That is, each undertakes a risk 
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which, given his circumstances, is neither ruinous nor 
trivial. He will then carry a manageable share of the 
burden of insecurity which is the inevitable counterpart 
of progress. But in seeking to share this burden fairly, 
we need, I think, often to look for other ways to express 
it than the form of a commercial loan. 
